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THE RIGHTS OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING
DISABILITIES AND THE RESPONSIBILITIES
OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
Robert W. Edwards*
INTRODUCTION
New York University revoked the admission of Justin Fruth,
a seventeen-year-old learning disabled student from Indiana,
because he refused to attend a mandatory orientation program for
learning disabled students admitted to the university.' The orien-
tation program was scheduled during the summer break, thereby
forcing the disabled students to interrupt their summer schedules
and arrive on campus several weeks before their fellow students. 2
Furthermore, the university required the learning disabled students
to pay a $750 fee to cover the costs of the orientation program, in
addition to the tuition and other fees charged to non-learning
disabled students.3 New York University maintains that the
program was designed to benefit persons with learning disabilities
by allowing extra time for such students to familiarize themselves
with the campus environment and to facilitate their registration
BLS Class of 1995. The author wishes to thank BLS Professor Minna
Kotkin for her comments during the preparation of this article.
Michael Winerip, Enrolled as Disabled but Ousted for Refusing Help,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1993, at A17.
2 Id.
3 Id.
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process.4 Justin Fruth commenced an action against New York
University claiming that the mandatory orientation program violates
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 5
Many actions filed against universities involve claims that
academic programs are not accessible to disabled students. Cases
such as Fruth v. N.Y. Univ. may require the courts to determine
whether universities can mandate participation by disabled students
in supplementary programs designed to facilitate their educational
experience.
Legislative action to prevent discrimination against persons
with disabilities, and the inclusion of learning disabilities within
such legislation, presents complicated issues for post-secondary
educational institutions. Such issues include whether a university
should be required to admit a learning disabled person whom it
determines may not be capable of successfully participating in its
academic program and the considerations of the university in
making such a determination. In addition, if the university decides
that a learning disabled student may have the potential to success-
fully pursue a degree with supplemental programs or assistance,
there is a question as to whether the university can require that the
student participate in the supplemental programs and who should
be responsible for any additional costs. Also at issue is the extent
to which exams should be modified to accommodate disabled
students, and whether universities may refuse to modify their
exams, claiming academic freedom.
This Note will examine the inclusion of learning disabilities
in the Americans with Disabilities Act and the problems encoun-
tered by institutions of higher education in attempting to achieve
compliance with the ADA. These problems are often a result of an
institution's efforts to assist persons with disabilities. The Note will
also include an analysis of the definition of the term "qualified
individual with a disability" and a review of the Americans with
Disabilities Act to determine whether programs such as a manda-
tory orientation program for learning disabled students are prohibit-
4 Id.
5 Fruth v. N.Y. Univ., Civ. No. 93-5572 (S.D.N.Y. August 10, 1993).
214
LEARNING DISABILITIES
ed. Specifically, the Note will analyze whether, in accordance with
the ADA, universities may mandate programs for students with
disabilities in the absence of similar requirements for non-disabled
students as a condition of admission and continued enrollment. In
conclusion, it will be argued that special programs and assistance
offered by universities to learning disabled students must be
optional if universities are to remain in compliance with the
Americans with Disabilities Act.
Persons Covered by the ADA
On July 26, 1990, President George Bush signed into law
the Americans with Disabilities Act, thereby extending protection
against discriminatory practices to millions of disabled persons.6
Prior to the signing of the ADA, persons with disabilities received
limited protection against discrimination from the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973. 7 The protections granted by the Rehabilitation Act
were only applicable in those instances in which a disabled person
was discriminated against by a federal contractor or federal
agency.8 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 expanded
upon the protections contained within the earlier legislation by
seeking to prevent discriminatory practices against persons with
disabilities in virtually every element of society, including private
schools, universities, restaurants, transportation services, telecom-
munication services, and by private employers and landlords.9
The Americans with Disabilities Act affects the operation
of every business in the United States considered under the statute
6 Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (1990)).
7 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
8 See Mark D. Laponsky, Defining "Disability", 39 FED. B. NEWS & J.
44 (1992).
9 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
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to be a "public accommodation."'" This term includes, among
many other places, inns and hotels;" restaurants and bars; 12
laundromats, banks, and gas stations; 3 private universities,
colleges, and other places of education; 14 grocery stores, shopping
centers, stadiums and movie theaters; and other places of public
gathering. 5 The statute prohibits discrimination against disabled
persons in any of the above-referenced places by declaring that:
"[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place
of public accommodation.0
6
The term "disability" is defined under the ADA as follows:
"(A) a physical or emotional impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment."' 7 This definition includes not only persons
with an actual disability, but also persons with a prior record of a
disability, though such a person may not actually suffer from any
of the effects of the prior disability, and persons mistakenly
10 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1992).
"1 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1992).
15 Id.
16 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1992).
17 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1992).
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perceived by an institution or employer as having such a disabili-
ty. 18 A physical or mental impairment is defined as:
(1) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmet-
ic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or
more of the following body systems: neurological,
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory
(including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproduc-
tive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic,
skin and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or physiological disorder, such as
mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emo-
tional or mental illness, and specific learning dis-
abilities.19
The term "major life activities" includes walking, talking, breath-
ing, learning, working, performing manual tasks, hearing and caring
for oneself.2"
The language defining a disability under the ADA is
identical to that contained in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
defining "individual with a handicap.",21 Given the similarities
between the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the ADA, the Interpre-
tive Guidelines for the ADA drafted by the Department of Justice
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reflect many
of the interpretations reached by the courts in the extensive litiga-
18 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1993); see also Cook v. R.I. Dep't of
Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps., 1993 WL 470697, at *2 (1st Cir. Nov.
22, 1993) (Although the court found that the plaintiff's morbid obesity
constituted a disability, it further noted that such a determination was not
necessary to rule in favor of the plaintiff. If the employer mistakenly perceived
the plaintiff to be disabled, and denied her employment based upon his
misperception, whether an actual disability existed is immaterial. Persons
perceived as being disabled are protected by the legislation.).
19 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1)(2) (1993).
20 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1993).
21 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A) (1993).
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tion brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.22 Similarly, the
courts, in identifying those persons covered under the ADA, and in
analyzing whether such persons have suffered from discriminatory
practices, frequently rely upon the tests and standards reached
during the extensive litigation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Courts have interpreted Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act quite
broadly in deciding who is eligible for protection under a federal
disability statute. Under Section 504, disabled status has been
granted to an alcoholic student,23 a learning disabled student,24
25 26a person with a heart condition,' a kleptomaniac, persons with
27 282diabetes, a morbidly obese person, a compulsive gambler,29
and a drug addict.3" Courts have denied granting handicap status
22 See H.R. Rep. No. 485, Part 2, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 53-55 (1990).
23 Anderson v. University of Wis., 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1988).
24 Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991).
25 Commonwealth v. Brown, 558 A.2d 121 (1989), vacated on other
grounds, 620 A.2d 1139 (Pa. 1993).
26 Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Md. 1988), affd, 888 F.2d
1385 (4th Cir. 1989). See also infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (in
drafting the ADA, Congress expressly excluded kleptomania as a disability).
27 Serrapica v. City of New York, 708 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd,
888 F.2d 126 (2d. Cir. 1989).
28 Cook v. R.I. Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hosps., 1993
WL 470697, at *2 (1st Cir. Nov. 22, 1993) (a morbidly obese person is
considered by the medical profession to be one who weighs more than twice his
or her optimal weight or 100 pounds more than his or her optimal weight).
29 Rezza v. Dep't of Justice, 698 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
30 Nisperos v. Buck, 720 F. Supp. 1424 (N.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 936
F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1991).
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to a person with a fear of heights,3 an individual suffering from
occasional bout of stress or mental exhaustion,3" a person with
varicose veins,33 and a person with severe sensitivity to insect
bites.34
It is widely assumed that courts will continue to broadly
interpret the ADA, offering protection to a variety of disabled per-
sons. The legislature, however, apparently disagreeing with several
of the extensions granted by the courts, has expressly stated that
certain categories of persons shall be excluded from protection
under the ADA. For example, Section 511 of the ADA states that
homosexuality and bisexuality shall not be considered disabilities
even though courts have never considered these sexual orientations
to be disabilities.35 This section further provides that certain
conditions such as transvestitism, exhibitionism, pedophilia,
compulsive gambling, kleptomania, and disorders resulting from the
current use of drugs shall not be included in the definition of
"disability" as this term is used in the ADA.36 The enactment of
the ADA presented Congress with the opportunity to review the
current state of disability law and to amend the current legislation
in order to disallow certain broad interpretations reached by the
courts under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. While specific
categories of persons were expressly excluded by the legislature
under the ADA, many of the types of disabilities recognized by the
31 Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
32 Pressman v. University of N.C. at Charlotte, 337 S.E.2d 644 (1985)
(decided under a North Carolina state statute protecting disabled individuals).
33 Oesterling v. Walters, 760 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1985).
34 James v. Runyon, 1992 WL 382311 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 6 F. 3d 779(3rd Cir. 1993).
35 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a) (1992).
36 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (1992).
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courts under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 remain protected.
Among those continuing to receive protection under the ADA are
learning disabled persons.37 Courts have held certain mental
disabilities to be clearly within the purview of legislation such as
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. These disabilities
include schizophrenia,38 severe psychiatric difficulties,39 mental
retardation, n° and specific learning disabilities.4' Congress has
defined the term "specific learning disabilities" in the Education of
Individuals with Disabilities Act, finding that this term should be
used to describe conditions such as perceptual handicaps, brain
injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental
aphasia.42
Other conditions, which may arguably be considered mental
disabilities, have not received such status under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 or the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Such
conditions include poor judgment, irresponsible behavior, and a
37 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (1993).
38 See Boalthouse v. Continental Wingate Co., 656 F. Supp. 620 (W.D.
Mich. 1987) (Plaintiffs alleged they were denied subsidized housing because of
their disabilities, cerebral palsy and schizophrenia. The court held that both were
handicapped within the definition of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.).
39 See Doe v. Marshall, 459 F.Supp. 1190 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (holding
that student suffering from severe psychiatric difficulties was handicapped).
40 See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp.
1295, 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (distinguishing mental retardation from mental ill-
ness, the court stated that the former was "primarily an educational problem and
not a disease which can be cured through drugs or treated."), aff d, 612 F.2d 81
(3d Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 151 U.S. 1 (1981).
41 See Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (11th Cir. 1983).
42 Education of Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(15)
(1988).
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lack of impulse control.43 Courts have also rejected occasional
stress, depression and mental exhaustion as disabilities under stat-
utes aimed at protecting disabled persons from discrimination.44
In litigation arising in connection with claims of mental
impairments, courts have closely adhered to the statutory language
by refusing to grant plaintiffs the protection of disability laws
without evidence that their disability substantially interferes with
"a major life activity." For example, an employee suffering from
mental stress caused by a poor working relationship with her
supervisor would probably not be successful in arguing that her
stress was a disability under the ADA. The disability must interfere
with a major life activity, and although in this example it does
interfere with her ability to perform a specific job, in order for it
to substantially limit a major life activity it must interfere with her
ability to work in general. In effect, the stress must interfere with
her ability to perform any job. Instead of being regarded as having
a "substantial limitation" of a "major life activity," a person
suffering from stress due to a poor working relationship with a
supervisor would more likely be considered as "unsuited for one
position in one plant - nothing more."'45 If the stress were to
substantially interfere with a person's ability to work in other
positions as well, however, it would constitute a disability under
the terms of the ADA.'
In addition, courts will not consider an impairment a
43 See Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Winston
v. Maine Technical Schl., 631 A.2d 70 (Me. 1993) (A teacher, dismissed from
his job after kissing a student, claimed that he suffered from poor sexual impulse
control and that the school's action in dismissing him violated the ADA. The
court rejected this argument.).
44 See Pressman v. University of N. C., 337 S.E.2d 611 (1985) (finding
that the university's decision to terminate an employee who claimed she suffered
from occasional stress, depression, and mental exhaustion did not violate a North
Carolina statute protecting disabled persons).
45 See Forrisi v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir. 1986).
46Id.
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limitation on a major life activity if it is of a temporary dura-
tion.4 7 The employee in the above hypothetical, therefore, would
probably not be successful in an action under the ADA. A court
would construe her disability as one of a temporary duration,
lasting only as long as she worked with the supervisor, and not
interfering with her ability to work in general, but rather with her
ability to perform a particular job. A similar analysis of a claim
for protection under a federal disability statute could be performed
in an educational context as well. A university student who suffers
from stress or anxiety in a class with a particular professor, or from
a difficult exam period, would probably not be entitled to the
protections offered under the ADA. Similar to private employers,
colleges and universities would be entitled to distinguish between
temporary disabilities and permanent disabilities in deciding
whether to accommodate students under the ADA or the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973. Based upon prior judicial interpretations relating
to employment, a university would not be required under the
existing legislation to grant accommodations to students complain-
ing of stress in a particular class, or temporary fatigue, depression,
or mental exhaustion during exam periods. 48 Of course, this means
only that the ADA does not require academic institutions to grant
accommodation to temporary disabilities. Universities and colleges
may, however, decide to offer students with such problems relief
through internal medical leave policies or other administrative
means.
Qualified Individual with a Disability
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that "[n]o other-
wise qualified individual with handicaps ... shall, solely by reason
of his or her handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
47 See Evans v. City of Dallas, 861 F.2d 846, 852 (5th Cir. 1988)
(finding that a temporary knee injury was not a handicap under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973).
48 Id. See also Forrisi, 791 F.2d at 935.
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program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."'49 The
term "otherwise qualified handicapped person" was used in the
Rehabilitation Act to prevent discrimination against persons able to
meet the requirements for a position in every respect, except for
limitations arising from their handicap.5" A literal interpretation
of this term would prevent institutions from taking into account any
type of limitation resulting from an individual's disability, irrespec-
tive of the extent to which the disability would interfere with job
or academic performance. The regulations put forth by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare to interpret Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, however, utilized the term "qualified
handicapped person" and omitted the word "otherwise."'" This
change in terminology was necessary to avoid literal interpretations
permitting, for example, a person possessing all of the qualifica-
tions for driving a truck, except sight, to be found "otherwise
qualified" for a job as a driver.52
The legislature sought to prevent the problems of interpreta-
tion which arose as a result of the wording of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 and, therefore, changed the terminology of the ADA
to prevent discrimination against a "qualified individual with a dis-
ability.5 3 This term is defined in the ADA as:
an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable modifications to rules, policies or practic-
es, the removal of architectural, communication or
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary
49 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
50 Id.
51 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3) (1978).
52 See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 407 n.7
(1979).
53 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1992).
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aids and services meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or the
participation in programs or activities provided by a
public entity. 4
This definition includes many of the interpretations reached by the
courts in litigation involving the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Accordingly, a review of the decisions reached under the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973 will provide a basis for understanding the
elements of the above definition. Given the similarities between the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the same type of analysis
will be used by the courts in cases seeking clarification of the term
"qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA.5
During the admissions process, a university must first
determine whether a student claiming a disability is considered a
"qualified individual with a disability." The United States Supreme
Court has provided a definition, in the context of university admis-
sions, to the term "otherwise qualified" as contained in Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.56 In Southeastern Community
College v. Davis,57 a deaf nursing school student brought an
action under the Rehabilitation Act after the college refused to
admit her into a clinical training program. The district court entered
judgment for the university deciding that the plaintiff's handicap
would prevent her from safely completing the training program and
practicing in the nursing profession. 8 The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Southeastern had to
54 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1992).
55 See Coleman v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 824 F. Supp.
1360, 1367 (D. Neb. 1993). See also infra text accompanying notes 115-24.
56 See Davis, 442 U.S. 397.
57 Davis, 442 U.S. 397.
58 Id.
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disregard any limitation resulting from a handicap and evaluate her
credentials without considering that the only manner in which she
could follow the instruction would be by lip-reading.5 9
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this reasoning and
held that "[a]n otherwise qualified person is one who is able to
meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap."60
Thus, a university was not required to accommodate a handicapped
individual if such an accommodation would result in "substantial
modifications" to the existing program.6' The Court stated in
Davis that "[i]f these regulations [referring to the Dept. of HEW
guidelines]62 were to require substantial adjustments in existing
programs beyond those necessary to eliminate discrimination
against otherwise qualified individuals, they would do more than
clarify the meaning of Sec. 504. ,63 The Court further found that
"[i]t is undisputed that the respondent could not participate in
Southeastern's nursing program unless the standards were substan-
tially lowered.... [S]ection 504 imposes no requirement upon an
educational institution to lower or to effect substantial modifica-
tions of standards to accommodate a handicapped person., 64 After
the Davis decision, courts only required that universities demon-
strate a rational basis for denying admission to a disabled student.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 406. See also 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1985) (stating that in the
employment context the term "otherwise qualified" refers to one who can
perform the "essential functions" of the job in question).
61 Id. at 410. (In putting forth this reasoning the Court accepted
Southeastern's argument that a substantial portion of the instruction would take
place in a surgical room in which instructors would be required to wear surgical
masks).
62 45 C.F.R § 84.44 (1978).
63 Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,410 (1979).
64 Id. at 413.
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Universities were not required, however, to explore the issue of
whether a reasonable accommodation would permit a disabled
student to successfully participate in the academic program. 65
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of "reasonable
accommodation" nearly six years later in Alexander v. Choate.66
Reviewing its previous holding in Davis, the Court noted that:
Davis . . . struck a balance between the statutory
rights of the handicapped to be integrated into
society and the legitimate interests of federal grant-
ees in preserving the integrity of their programs:
while a grantee need not be required to make
'fundamental' or 'substantial' modifications to
accommodate the handicapped, it may be required
to make 'reasonable' ones.67
The Court's decision in Alexander altered the previous
holding in Davis and required institutions to now demonstrate that
a reasonable accommodation, which would allow the "otherwise
qualified person" to participate, was not available.6 This change
forced the courts to recognize the paradox implicit in the Supreme
Court's analysis of the phrase "otherwise qualified." Davis held
that "an otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all
of a programs requirements in spite of his handicap. "69 Alexander
required that a program make "reasonable accommodations," if
such an accommodation would allow participation by an "otherwise
qualified handicapped person." An "otherwise qualified handi-
65 Id.
66 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
67 Id. at 300.
68 Id.
69 Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
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capped person" thus became one capable of participating in a
program if a "reasonable accommodation" was available for
implementation by the institution.
Accordingly, universities and colleges, in deciding whether
to admit "a qualified individual with a disability," must first make
a factual determination as to whether the individual "meets the
academic and technical standards requisite to admission or
participation in the . . . education program or activity. 7 If the
response to this inquiry is negative, the institutions must next
determine whether a "reasonable accommodation" exists which will
allow the individual to successfully participate in the academic
program.71
Courts have granted deference to the safety concerns of
academic institutions in the admission of disabled students to
health-related programs such as medical and nursing schools.72 In
fact, in Davis, the district court was especially concerned by the
fact that the clinical portion of the training program took place in
an operating room and the instructors lips would be covered by a
surgical mask. The court noted that the plaintiff, a deaf nursing
student, would have difficulty communicating under such circum-
stances, causing safety concerns for both the plaintiff and prospec-
tive patients.73 In Doe v. New York University,74 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with the lower court's
70 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3) (1985).
71 See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300; see also Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d
666 (11 th Cir. 1983) (finding that the Tennessee Valley Authority failed to ex-
Plore "reasonable accommodations" prior to denying entrance to a learning dis-
abled employee into an apprentice program for a position as a heavy equipment
operator).
72 See Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 777 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that
"[iut would be unreasonable to infer that Congress intended to force institutions
to admit or readmit persons who pose a significant risk to themselves or others").
73 Davis, 442 U.S. 397.
74 Doe, 666 F.2d. 761.
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standard that Doe, a medical school applicant prone to self-
destructive behavior in stressful situations, should be "deemed
qualified if it appeared 'more likely than not' that she could
complete her medical training and serve as a physician without
recurrence of her self-destructive and anti-social conduct." 75
Instead, the court of appeals found that "she would not be qualified
for readmission if there is a significant risk of such recurrence."
7 6
Once a disabled student is admitted to a college or universi-
ty, he or she must meet the academic standards required to
maintain enrollment at the institution." For example, a law
student who was dismissed from the University of Wisconsin for
his failure to meet the minimum academic requirements claimed
that his alcoholism was the cause of his inadequate performance. s
The university readmitted him on two occasions, but he again
failed to meet the minimum academic requirements. After he was
dismissed by the university, the student brought an action claiming
that the school discriminated against him in violation the Rehabili-
tation Act of 1973. 71 The court recognized the student's alcohol-
ism as a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act, but found that he
75 Doe, 666 F.2d. at 777.
76 Id.
77 See Anderson v. Univ. of Wis., 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1988); see
also McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, Civ. No. 91-4328 (E.D.
La. 1992) ( The law school granted a physically and neurologically disabled stu-
dent accommodations including additional time for exams and access to faculty
members for additional assistance. In spite of these accommodations, the student
was unable to meet the academic requirements of the program. Upon his
dismissal for low test scores, the student brought an action under the Reha-
bilitation Act claiming that the university had discriminated against him. The
court ruled that his low test scores, even with the accommodations, indicated that
he was not "otherwise qualified" for the program, and his dismissal, therefore,
did not violate the Rehabilitation Act.), affid, 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993), petitionfor cert. filed, (Dec. 23, 1993) (No. 93-7279).
78 Anderson, 841 F.2d 737.
79Id.
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was not "otherwise qualified" as required by the statute."0 The
university's decision to dismiss him, therefore, was determined not
to be a violation of the Rehabilitation Act.8'
Reasonable Accommodation
In 1992, nearly 20,000 students took a specialized version
of the SAT examination for learning disabled students.82 The
special tests allow a student 12 hours over two days to complete
the test instead of the usual single session lasting for two and a
half hours. 83 The number of students enrolling for these special-
ized tests has been growing by 10 to 15 percent per year for the
past decade.84 As colleges and universities receive an increasing
number of applications from students recognized as learning
disabled, requests for reasonable accommodations will also increase
and become more unique. The difficult task for the academic
institutions is to determine which of these requests constitute
reasonable accommodations, and which requests are unduly burden-
some, infringe upon the academic freedom of the university, or
substantially alter the academic program.85  Traditionally,
courts have granted substantial deference to schools in deciding
cases involving the alteration of academic programs. In Sweezy v.
80 Id. at 740.
81 Id.
82 See Winerip, supra note 1, at A17.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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New Hampshire,86 the concurring opinion of this Supreme Court
decision identified the four essential freedoms of a university as:
determining for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be permitted
to study.3 7 Although federal legislation has increased involvement
of the courts in such academic determinations, they continue to
express concern when called upon to re-evaluate a university's
decision with respect to "an applicant's qualifications and whether
he or she would meet reasonable standards for academic and
professional achievement established by a university or a non-legal
profession."8
As mentioned earlier, the courts began requiring institutions
to look into the possibility of a "reasonable accommodation" in
1985 after the Alexander case.8 9 The courts refrained, however,
from requiring institutions to implement the "reasonable accommo-
dation" if such action would impose "undue financial and adminis-
trative burdens" 90 or "[w]here reasonable accommodation does not
overcome the effects of a person's handicap, or where reasonable
accommodation causes undue hardship to the employer, failure to
promote the handicapped person will not be considered discrimi-
nation."'"
86 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
87 See Fruth v. New York Univ., No. 93 Civ. 5572 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)).
88 See Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 771, 775-76 (2d. Cir. 1981)
citing University of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92 (1978) ("[c]ourts are
particularly ill-equipped to evaluate academic performance").
89 See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
90 See School Bd. of Nassau Co. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 n. 17
(1987) (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 412).
"' Id. at 287-88 n.17 (1987) (citing Davis, 442 U.S. at 410-13; Alexan-
der, 469 U.S. at 299-301 n.19).
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The obligations of an academic institution, in exploring
whether a reasonable accommodation is available to permit a
learning disabled student to attend its academic program, were
succinctly set forth by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine.9" A student, Steven
Wynne, was dismissed from the School of Medicine after he failed
several courses during consecutive attempts to complete the first
year program.93 Wynne was diagnosed as suffering from a learn-
ing disability, dyslexia, and claimed that the university discriminat-
ed against him by failing to modify its exams to accommodate his
difficulties.94 Wynne maintained that the university failed to
provide him with an alternative to the multiple-choice exams
offered to first-year medical students, even though it was estab-
lished that his dyslexia interfered with his performance on such
tests.95
In Wynne, the court of appeals articulated the standard for
determining whether a university had met its obligations in explor-
ing a "reasonable accommodation" by finding that:
[i]f the institution submits undisputed facts demon-
strating that the relevant officials within the institu-
tion considered alternative means, their feasibility,
cost and effect on the academic program, and came
to a rationally justifiable conclusion that the avail-
able alternatives would result in lowering academic
standards or requiring substantial program alteration,
the court could rule as a matter of law that the
institution had met its duty of seeking reasonable
92 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991).
93 Id. at 20.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 22.
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accommodation.96
In this contextthe university submitted an affidavit from the Dean
of the School of Medicine which stated that the purpose of the
multiple choice tests .was to "measure a student's ability not only
to memorize complicated material, but to understand and assimilate
it... [and] [i]n the judgment of the professional medical educators
who are responsible for determining testing procedures at Tufts,
written multiple choice examinations are important as a matter of
substance, not merely form."'97 The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, in setting aside the summary judgment granted to the
university by the district court, discounted the affidavit. The court
pointed out that the affidavit failed to expound upon the unique
qualities of multiple choice examinations over other types of
exams, or consider alternatives for accommodating a handicapped
student.98 This type of review places a heavy burden on the
university to demonstrate that it has exhausted all possible means
of accommodating a disabled student before denying or revoking
the admission of such a student. Under Wynne, if a university
rejects a proposed "reasonable accommodation," it must be
prepared to articulate the grounds for the rejection in substantial
detail.
In determining whether a university or college may offer a
reasonable accommodation to a student, the academic institutions
often examine the availability of auxiliary aids such as tutors, note-
takers, and interpreters. The regulations concerning the provision
of auxiliary aids as a "reasonable accommodation" under Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 were substantially clarified
96 Id. at 26. But see McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors,
aff d, 3 F.3d 850, 859 n.11 (5th Cir. 1993) (disagreeing with the proposition that
the burden of proof rests with the university to demonstrate how a proposed
accommodation would substantially alter its program), petition for cert. filed,
(Dec. 23, 1993) (No. 93-7279).
97 See Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir.
1991).
98 Id. at 28.
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in United States v. Bd. of Trustees for the Univ. of Ala.99 In this
case, the University of Alabama was investigated by the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare after a deaf student filed a
complaint stating that her request for an interpreter had been denied
by the university.'0° Upon the commencement of this investiga-
tion, the University of Alabama at Birmingham ("UAB") set up an
auxiliary aids policy which provided that the university would
furnish note-takers and transcripts of the courses to deaf students,
but not costly interpreters.' 1 The policy of UAB further stated
that if students required the services of an interpreter, they should
contact the university several months before the academic quarter
so that UAB could assist them with finding interpreters through the
Vocational Rehabilitation Service, or if they were not eligible for
this service, through student loans or other financial aid." ! In
addition, this policy excluded students taking non-degree or non-
credit courses from receiving auxiliary aids from UAB.'0 3 The
university argued that it offered the same benefit to all qualified
students, and that benefit was an opportunity to be educated. It
further argued that "[s]ome students are smarter than others, some
work harder than others, and... [s]ome will incur more expenses
than others.10 4 UAB also claimed that under Alexander, it was not
required to change its program "simply to meet the reality that the
deaf must spend more money to receive the same results as hearing
99 908 F.2d 740 (11 th Cir. 1990).
100 Id. at 742.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 748.
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students."'0 5
The Eleventh Circuit, not surprisingly, rejected this
argument, finding that in some instances "the lack of an auxiliary
aid would effectively deny a handicapped student equal access to
his or her opportunity to learn.""''6 The court affirmed the deci-
sion of the district court to enjoin UAB from "denying auxiliary
aids to handicapped students based upon consideration of their
financial status.' 7
In deciding whether to provide an auxiliary aid as a
reasonable accommodation to a disabled student, the university may
not consider the financial status of the student benefiting from the
auxiliary aid.'0 8 The provision of auxiliary aids such as taped
examinations, interpreters, readers for students with visual and
learning disabilities, and other similar services is required unless
the institution can demonstrate that providing such aids will
fundamentally alter the academic program or result in an undue
burden on the institution. The university or college is not required
to provide "attendants, individually prescribed devices, readers for
personal use or study, or other devices or services of a personal na-
ture. ,,t°9
Individualized Inquiry
There is a nexus between the requirements for attendance
at an institution of higher education and the admittance of learning
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 746-49 (finding that the Department of Education had
consistently asserted that the consideration of a students financial status in
considering the availability of an accommodation was a violation of Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
109 34 C.F.R. § 104.44 (1989).
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disabled students. The nexus has a parallel in employment cases
that require employers to perform a thorough analysis of the
requirements of the job and possible accommodations before
denying employment to a disabled person."0 In Nassau Co.
School Bd. v. Arline,"' the Supreme Court considered a claim by
a teacher dismissed from her position because she suffered from
recurring tuberculosis. The teacher claimed that the school board's
decision to dismiss her because of the disease violated the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973.12 The Court in Arline described the necessi-
ty of performing an individualized inquiry if the institution aspires
to meet the requirements of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
After concluding that Ms. Arline was entitled to protection under
the Act," 3 the Court further noted that:
[t]he remaining question is whether Arline is other-
wise qualified for the job of elementary school
teacher. To answer this question in most cases the
District Court will need to conduct an individualized
inquiry and make appropriate findings of fact. Such
an inquiry is necessary if Section 504 is to achieve
its goal of protecting handicapped individuals from
deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or
unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to
such legitimate concerns of [the school board] as
avoiding exposing others to significant health and
safety concerns." 4
110 See School Bd. of Nassau Co. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
II' Id.
112 Id.
"13 Id. at 287.
114 Id.
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An individualized inquiry is necessary to ensure that regulations
pertaining to disabled persons are not overbroad. Frequently, insti-
tutions enacti blanket policies for their treatment of disabled
persons, and often such policies result in regulations unfairly im-
pacting upon a person because of an actual or perceived disability.
A recent district court decision in Nebraska demonstrates the
importance of requiring institutions to perform individualized
inquiries before regulating the conduct of disabled persons."15 In
Coleman v. Zatechka, 1 6 a student with cerebral palsy challenged
a housing policy at the University of Nebraska which prevented all
disabled students with attendant care-takers from being assigned
roommates. The Director of Housing for the university noted that
the policy was enacted in response to complaints of embarrassment
by disabled students at having an assigned roommate present
during the attendant care visits. 17 The court found that the
disabled student, having been admitted to the university and having
submitted a residence hall contract application was "qualified"
under the ADA to participate in the roommate assignment pro-
gram."1
8
The university argued that she was not "qualified" because "her
disability requires her to use more space than allotted to a double
room occupant and to have attendant care visits at least three times
a day, thereby impinging on the physical space and solitude" of her
roommate. Since non-disabled students were not required to
demonstrate that they would only use one-half of the room, the
10 Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Neb. 1993).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1364. (The university's policy was worded as follows:
"[a]lthough the University will attempt to assign residence hall living accom-
modations to all students based upon the choices made in a student's residence
hall contract application, the University cannot always do so. In the case of
students with disabilities or special medical considerations, double rooms will not
be assigned if personal attendant service, nursing care, or trained animal
assistance is required unless there is a mutual room request.").
118 Id. at 1367.
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court considered the university's policy as imposing additional
eligibility requirements on disabled students." 9 It further noted
that the ADA prohibited the use of eligibility criteria that "screen
out or tend to screen out . . . any class of individuals with
disabilities from fully enjoying any service, program or activity,
unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision
of the service, program, or activity being offered.'
20
In rejecting the university's argument that the disabled
student would use more space and impinge upon the privacy of the
roommate, the court noted the university's failure to conduct an
individualized inquiry to determine the actual amount of space used
by the plaintiff. The university simply assumed that because she
used a wheelchair, she would use more than half the space.' 2'
Such assumptions are prohibited under the ADA and institutions
seeking to regulate the conduct of disabled students must glean
facts and conclusions from individualized inquiries. 22 This is
necessary to ensure that regulations applying to disabled persons
are based upon facts and not presumptions about what such a class
of persons can or cannot do.
Most importantly, in Coleman, the district court recognized
that even though the policy of providing disabled students with a
single room may have originated as an accommodation to such
students, "nothing in the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA requires
that [disabled students] accept such accommodations."' 23 The
court further noted that the regulations of both the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act require that the participation by disabled persons
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1368.
121 Id. at 1369.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 1372.
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in special accommodations must be an option and not mandato-
ry. 124
Section 302 of the ADA includes a general prohibition
against various types of activities by a public accommodation
which may result in a "denial of participation," "participation of
unequal benefit," or the provision of a "separate benefit" to
disabled persons. In addition, public accommodations must provide
disabled persons with "integrated settings," the "opportunity to
participate," and "administrative methods" which do not discrimi-
nate or have a discriminating effect.'25
Without question the "denial of participation" of disabled
persons in an activity or "participation of unequal benefit" would
have a discriminatory effect. Equally harmful, however, is the
provision of a "separate benefit" for disabled persons. The statute
provides, with respect to a separate benefit, that:
[i]t shall be discriminatory to provide an individual
or class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or
disabilities of such individual or class . . . with a
good, service, facility, privilege, advantage or
accommodation that is different or separate from
that provided to other individuals, unless such action
is necessary to provide the individual or class of
individuals with a good, service, facility, privilege,
advantage or accommodation, or other opportunity
that is as effective as that provided to others. 126
124 Id. ("Even when separate programs are permitted, individuals with
disabilities cannot be denied the opportunity to participate in programs that are
not separate or different. This is an important and overarching principle of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Separate, special or different programs that are
designed to provide a benefit... cannot be used to restrict the participation of
persons with disabilities in general integrated activities .... Modified participa-
tion for persons with disabilities must be a choice not a requirement."). See also
28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. B, at 593 (1993).
125 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1992).
126 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1992).
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An academic institution may believe that it has adequately met its
obligations to learning disabled students by providing a separate
program for such students. The above provision, however, forces
the university to first establish that the separate program is neces-
sary in order to provide an equal benefit (an education) to such
students. In establishing that a separate program is necessary, the
college or university must base its conclusion on the facts of an
individualized inquiry into the needs of the students for whom the
program is designed. The purpose of the inquiry is to justify the
creation of a separate program, rather than the modification of an
existing program. A determination that the separate program is
necessary to provide an equal benefit to disabled students does not
permit the university to then require all disabled students to
participate. 27
A Functional Analysis of the Effect of the ADA on University
Programs
In responding to issues of disability in the educational
context, a college or university must first determine whether a
person claiming protection under the ADA is a qualified individual
with a disability. 128 In order to be eligible for protection under
the ADA, such a person must be diagnosed as having a disability
which substantially interferes with a major life activity.'29 As
mentioned earlier, temporary disabilities, such as a broken bone or
temporary stress or depression, will not be entitled to the protectio-
ns offered by the ADA. 3 ° The statutory language of the ADA
127 See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. B, at 593 (1993).
128 See Southeastern Comm. College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
129 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1992).
130 See Evans v. City of Dallas, 861 F.2d 846, 852 (5th Cir. 1988)
(finding that a temporary knee injury was not a handicap under the Rehabilitation
Act); see also Forrisi v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 931, 935 (4th Cir. 1986).
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explicitly recognizes learning as a major life activity.' The
existence of a professionally diagnosed learning disability will,
therefore, render a person eligible for the protection of the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.132 After the establishment of
the fact that the student has a recognized disability under the ADA,
the next inquiry is whether the disabled student meets the academic
and technical standards required for admission to the program or
activity. 133 According to Wynne, an academic institution is not
required to lower or substantially alter its program to accommodate
a learning disabled student.3 4 It is required, however, to incorpo-
rate a reasonable accommodation if such an accommodation will
allow a disabled person to participate in the academic program.'35
An accommodation which does not substantially alter the program
or cause undue financial burden will be considered a reasonable
accommodation. 136
A paradox exists with respect to the admission of learning
disabled individuals to universities and colleges. Academic institu-
tions do not affirmatively seek to determine whether a student is
disabled through the application process. The learning disabled
students, however, may find it necessary to disclose the existence
of their disability in order for the admissions committee to consider
their application in spite of grade discrepancies in certain subjects,
low grade point averages or standardized test scores, or to obtain
'31 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2).
132 Id.
133 See Davis, 442 U.S. 397; see also supra note 70 and accompanying
text.
134 Wynne v. Tufts Univ. School of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19, 26 (1 st Cir.
1991).
135 See Alexander, 469 U.S. 287; see also supra notes 66-68 and
accompanying text.
136 See Wynne, 932 F.2d at 26.
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reasonable accommodations from the university, such as alternative
tests, program modifications, auxiliary aids, or additional time for
exams.' The identification of learning disabled gstudents in the
application process is logical if universities are required to
determine whether an individual is a "qualified individual with a
disability." The factors universities use in deciding which students
to accept are often reflective of an individual's ability to learn.
Persons with diagnosed learning disabilities should receive special
consideration and the benefit of any available "reasonable accom-
modation" from universities and colleges. Again, this does not
require academic institutions to lower their standards to accommo-
date such persons.138
Assume, for example, that a university accepts only students
with a minimum high school grade point average of 3.5 into its
entering class. A learning disabled student with a 2.5 grade point
average applies and identifies himself as learning disabled on his
application. If such a student has received reasonable accommoda-
tions during his high school studies, he would probably not be
considered a "qualified individual with a disability." As a learning
disabled student, his disability would be recognized under the
ADA, but he would not meet the essential eligibility requirements
to be considered a "qualified individual with a disability."'139 The
university would be able to argue that accepting such students
would lower its academic standards. The university should be
prepared, however, to demonstrate the nexus between a 3.5 grade
point average in high school and successful participation in the
137 See Salvador v. Bell, 622 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affid, 800
F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that an institution did not violate the Reha-
bilitation Act in refusing to admit a student since it did not know that the person
was learning disabled).
138 See Wynne, 932 F.2d at 26.
139 See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1992).
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academic program."
Another example is an applicant with a 3.5 grade point
average who identifies herself as learning disabled and informs the
university that she will need additional time for her exams and, as
an auxiliary aid, a reader to read her exam questions out loud. The
university may be concerned with the additional expense of
providing a reader or that granting additional time for exams will
alter its academic program. This applicant, however, would be
considered a "qualified individual with a disability" and, unless the
university is prepared to show that her requested accommodations
would be unduly burdensome or substantially alter its academic
program, she should be admitted.14 1 In addition, the university
must incur the additional costs of providing her with an auxiliary
aid.
142
In a variation of the above hypothetical, similar to the Fruth
case described earlier,143 assume that the university decides to
admit several learning disabled students with grade point averages
and standardized test scores slightly below the average for its
entering class. The university conditions the admission of such
students on their attendance at a summer orientation program and
requires them to agree to register for a reduced course load each
140 E.g., that students with high school grade point averages below a 3.0
are less likely to be successful in the university's academic program and will, in
effect, lower the academic standards.
141 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)(1992); see also Alexander, 469 U.S. 287 (al-
though this case involved a Medicaid program, the general principle is that all
programs must be prepared to make reasonable accommodations for disabled
persons).
142 See United States v. Bd. of Trustees for the Univ. of Ala., 908 F.2d
740, 749 (11 th Cir. 1990); see also supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text.
143 Fruth v. N.Y. Univ., Civ. 93-5572 (S.D.N.Y. August 10, 1993).
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semester. 144 The summer orientation lasts longer than the orienta-
tion provided to non-learning disabled students. And since it is
taught by educational specialists, the university requires the
learning disabled students to pay an extra fee. The reduced course
load forces these students to attend summer classes, at an additional
expense, in order to graduate in four years. The university started
this program after several learning disabled students failed to
complete their academic programs and complained that the
university was not responsive to their needs.
A learning disabled student accepted to the university under
this program lives in another state and is working during the sum-
mer. He is unable to attend the summer program. The university
offers a similar but briefer program for non-disabled students a few
days before the beginning of the academic year and he decides to
attend this program rather than the earlier program for disabled
students. A few days prior to his departure, he receives a letter
from the university advising him that his admission has been
revoked due to his failure to attend the earlier orientation.
This student could bring an action against the university
under the ADA. He is a qualified individual with a disability, and
the university has mandated his participation in a separate program.
He would first point out that the university has created a separate
program, instead of modifying the orientation for non-disabled
students, without demonstrating that a separate program was
necessary to provide him with an orientation equal to that received
by the other students. The university may require all learning
disabled students to attend the orientation. Although the separate
program may be necessary for some of the disabled students, others
might benefit from the orientation with non-disabled students. In
defending itself against this claim, the university would be required
to demonstrate that an "individualized inquiry" proved that the
144 It is important to distinguish between a university requiring that all
students with lower academic qualifications attend a supplementary program, and
a university requiring that learning disabled students attend a supplementary or
separate program. In the latter, the university is making a distinction based upon
a disability. Requiring all students with low standards to attend a supplementary
program may have a disparate impact on disabled students. This analysis,
however, is aimed at instances in which the university is implementing a
program specifically for disabled students.
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separate program was necessary to provide this student with an
education of equal benefit to the education received by non-
disabled students.'45 The mere fact that the university developed
the program in response to complaints from disabled students
would be insufficient. In addition, if the separate program were
found to be necessary, the university might also be required to
explain why the orientation for disabled students could not be held
closer to the start of the academic year or concurrently with the
orientation for non-learning disabled students. The fact that the
program was held in the middle of the summer may have the
administrative effect of limiting the participation of disabled
students, and such administrative effects are prohibited by the
ADA.' 46 Furthermore, the university should be prevented from
charging the learning disabled students for their orientation since
the charges may also have the administrative effect of excluding
them from participation. 47
Finally, this student would claim that even if the university
can justify the existence of the separate program, it must be
optional rather than mandatory."4 Similarly, accommodations
such as a reduced course load and modified exams should also be
optional. If such accommodations were made available to learning
disabled students, but not required, the university would be in
compliance with the ADA. If the learning disabled students were
to decide not to participate in programs of accommodation and
their performance fell below the academic standards set by the
university to maintain enrollment, the university could dismiss
these students. The decision to dismiss these students, if based
upon their failure to meet the requisite academic standards, would
145 See Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Neb. 1993).
146 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(D) (1992).
147 Id. See also United States v. Bd. of Trustees for the Univ. of Ala.,
908 F.2d 740, 748 (11th Cir. 1990).
148 See Coleman, 824 F. Supp. at 1372; see also supra notes 116-24 and
accompanying text.
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not be a violation of the ADA 49
In reviewing an existing program, or in considering the
implementation of a new program impacting upon disabled
students, an academic institution must consider the legality of such
a program in light of the Americans with Disabilities Act. A
university may attempt to address the needs of disabled students
through the implementation of a separate program. 5 0 The ADA
requires a university which decides to offer a separate program to
establish that such a program is necessary to provide a student with
an educational benefit equal to that of his or her fellow
students. 5' In other words, an inquiry must be made as to wheth-
er the existing program is amenable to a reasonable accommodation
which would allow disabled students to participate with non-
disabled students. This inquiry is distinct from the issue of whether
the university can mandate participation by disabled students in the
separate program. This distinction is very important and may be a
source of confusion in attempts to comply with the ADA by
academic institutions. A university or college may conclude that a
separate program is necessary to provide an education of equal
benefit to disabled students. Next, the university or college might
consider that the classification of the separate program as necessary
permits it to mandate participation by disabled students. The
Americans with Disabilities Act, however, expressly states that
"[n]otwithstanding the existence of separate or different programs
or activities,.... an individual with a disability shall not be denied
the opportunity to participate in such programs or activities that are
not separate or different.' '152
149 See Anderson v. University. of Wis., 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1988);
McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, Civ. No. 91-4328 (E.D. La.
1992); see also supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
150 E.g., an orientation program or special classes or academic programs
for disabled students.
151 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(l)(A)(iii) (1992).
152 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(C) (1992). See also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App.
B, at 593 (1993).
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The following hypothetical may clarify this particular
distinction. Assume that a university admits fifteen learning
disabled students into its freshman class. All freshman students are
required to attend a literature course with a demanding reading
schedule and an emphasis on class participation. The university
decides to provide a separate literature course for the learning
disabled students with accommodations such as tutors and a lighter
reading schedule.
The ADA requires the university to establish that the
separate literature class is necessary to provide the learning
disabled students with an education equal to that of their fellow
students.' 53 The university could prove necessity through the
testimony of special education professionals.'54 In these circum-
stances, it may be true that this separate class encourages more
discussion among the learning disabled students and facilitates the
educational process. In addition, the cost of providing individual
tutors for each class may be burdensome, whereas providing a few
tutors for the entire class is possible. The university in this
situation would be able to demonstrate that this separate class is
necessary to provide an education of equal benefit to the learning
disabled students. This inquiry, however, will only permit the
university to establish a separate class. The term "necessary" does
not allow the university to require that all learning disabled
students enroll in the separate literature class. 55 A learning
disabled student must be allowed to study literature with the non-
disabled students if he or she so desires. 56
Again, the Americans with Disabilities Act does not require
the academic institution to lower its standards or substantially
153 Id.
154 Fruth v. New York Univ., Civ. No. 93-5572 (S.D.N.Y. August 10,
1993).
155 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1992).
156 42 U.S.C. 12182(b)(1)(C) (1992). See also 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 App. B,
at 593 (1993).
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modify the academic program, so if the disabled student does not
successfully complete the mainstream literature course, the
university may impose its normal sanctions on a learning disabled
student, including dismissal for a failure to meet the requisite
academic standards.'57 Furthermore, if the disabled student
participating in the mainstream literature course requests a tutor or
other accommodation, the university may note that a separate class
exists which provides such accommodations. It might argue that
providing individual accommodations for students choosing not to
attend the separate program creates an undue financial burden.'58
If the university were to mandate that all learning disabled students
attend the separate literature course, it would be in violation of the
ADA.
159
CONCLUSION
The courts must maintain diligence in ensuring that disabled
persons are not discriminated against by the various institutions of
our society. The task of reviewing the decisions of those institu-
tions which have denied admission or employment to disabled
persons is of great importance. Employers and academic institutions
are concerned by the financial costs of accommodating disabled
persons, and the law has recognized that in certain instances such
costs may indeed prohibit the employment or admittance of a
disabled person. In many other instances, however, the employer
or university may simply be trying to avoid incurring any addition-
al expense, including a minimal expense, and the court must be
prepared to enforce the legislation prohibiting such discrimination.
Equally important is the role of the courts in reviewing
programs designed to facilitate the acceptance of disabled students
157 See Anderson v. Univ. of Wis., 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1988);
McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, Civ. No. 91-4328 (E.D. La.
1992). See also supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
158 See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. B, at 594 (1993).
159 Id.
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to ensure that such programs do not have a discriminatory effect.
For example, the roommate program at the University of Nebraska
was originally designed to facilitate the acceptance of disabled
students, but was discriminatory to a disabled person desiring the
opportunity to share a room with a colleague upon arrival at the
university.' The courts must be especially diligent in reviewing
programs which mandate participation by disabled students. Both
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA seek to avoid mandated
participation in programs designed to facilitate the experience of
disabled persons. The Americans with Disabilities Act recognizes
the discriminatory effect that mandatory programs may have on
disabled students. The legislature has placed strict requirements on
institutions attempting to regulate the conduct of persons based
upon their actual or perceived disabilities. The courts must continue
to closely scrutinize such regulations, and pay particular attention
to programs which appear on their face to offer a benefit to
disabled persons.
Learning disabled students have overcome many obstacles
in arriving at the point where they are prepared to begin their post-
secondary education. Universities and colleges must be prepared to
offer these students reasonable accommodations as they pursue
their educational goals. In their efforts to accommodate such
students, however, institutions of higher education must pay close
attention to their academic programs and be certain that accommo-
dations are based upon the individual needs of each student and not
assumptions or stereotypes about the capabilities of groups of
students.
160 Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Neb. 1993).
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